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George Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory on Hostility and Anger: Beyond Philosophies
and Psychologies of Blame 
Note: This is a section from my paper ‘Personal Construct Theory as Radically Temporal
Phenomenology: George Kelly's Challenge to Embodied Intersubjectivity’
The way that Kelly treats moving from an act of love to an act of hate,  via his formulation of the
construct of  hostility, may indicate how far apart Kelly’s model and embodied intersubjective
approaches stand concerning the issue of the fundamental integrity  of experiencing. All feeling
and emotion for Kelly expresses an awareness of the relative ongoing success or failure in
relating new events to one’s outlook.  But his definition of hostility stands out from his account
of guilt, anxiety, fear and threat in that it consists of a two-stage process.
Kelly defines hostility as “the continued effort to extort validational evidence in favor of a type
of social prediction which has already proved itself a failure.”
Notice that this definition combines awareness of a validational event(invalidation) with a
response to that event(extortion of evidence).  Furthermore, as we will see, the way in which the
first step is understood  determines the sense of  the second step, and vice versa. The crucial
importance of interpretation in  fathoming what Kelly meant by hostility can be demonstrated in
the following questions:
How far-reaching did he mean his definition to be? Is hostility the same thing as anger, and if so,
is there such a thing as healthy, adaptive, anger, or do all forms of anger extort evidence? And
what about subtle forms of affective perturbation like irritation and annoyance? Are these also
forms of hostility?
One would have to look carefully through Kelly’s writings in order to find him using what may
be synonyms for hostility. Words like annoyed, angry, rage and furious appear in the context of
some of  his discussions of hostile behaviors. For instance, “ By this time John, frustrated in his
efforts to be manly, is furious at himself, the girl, and about everything in sight, and he is in no
mood to listen to advice. He turns his rage on the father, as if somehow here was the fiend behind
this maddening woman. In a moment the old man, who I am sure only wanted to be helpful, is
dead, the victim of John's nimble sword and wildly diffused hostility .”(Kelly 1969g)
Such passages don’t go far in clearing up matters, though, because Kelly wasn’t very helpful in
clarifying how he intended his readers to link his idiosyncratic definition of hostility with more
conventional uses of that term. Readers of Kelly are left to construct an understanding of hostility
consistent with their own vantage on his work as a whole. Let us see, then, how embodied
intersubjective positions are likely to treat Kellian hostility, given the way I have represented
them in this paper.  I want to contrast these perspectives with the radically temporal interpretation
I have been advancing. I have thus far argued that for the embodied intersubjective crowd, values
are contents with which we are co-infected, indoctrinated, jointly conditioned and shaped  via our
participation within cultural norms and practices. Another way of stating  this is to say that as an
actor in an always shifting social ensemble I am always vulnerable to caprice and  temptation, to
being swayed in one direction or another semi-arbitrarily in what I care about .  As this
ambiguous being who is not fully conscious to myself, my potential for capriciously motivated
behavior is what I would like to call my fundamental blamefulness. 
Now let us say that  I have been hurt and disappointed by someone I care deeply about, and as a
result I become angry with them.  They now  approach me and say “ I know I let you down. I was
wrong and I’m sorry“ (regardless of whether I prompted them or not). One could say that the
other’s sense of their guilt and  culpability is the mirror image of my anger.  The essence of the
anger-culpability binary   here is the two parties coping , as victim and perpetrator, with their
perception of an arbitrary lapse in values, a socially catalyzed drift in commitment to the
relationship on the part of the one , and the recognition of this caprice by the other. 
Let us then suppose that the hurt party believes  that the always present possibility of the other’s
straying,  succumbing to, being overcome by alienating valuative motives, is an expression of
human motivation in general as  dependent on arbitrary bodily and intersocial determinants. This
being the case , it would not be unreasonable for the hurt individual to formulate the hopeful
notion that the blameful, that is, capricious, behavior of the other can be coaxed back to
something close to its original alignment, so that the relationship’s intimacy can be restored.  The 
hopeful quality of the anger, then , is driven by a belief in the random malleability of human
motives. I am going to call this hopeful intervention ‘adaptive anger’. 
How does this scenario fit  in relation to Kelly’s hostility definition? Although it begins with an
experience of invalidation (hurt and disappointment), we would not seem to be justified in
considering the consequent hopeful intervention  (adaptive anger)  as an example of extortion of
validational evidence. After all, the angered party isn’t  denying that the dynamics of the
relationship have changed. One can argue that  they are merely making use of their perception of
the substantial randomness in the shaping of human motives in order to attempt to reshape
matters in a more favorable direction from their vantage, and this attempt may very well be
successful in eliciting  the other’s contrition and maybe even a plea for forgiveness of their
deviation. 
More precisely, the angered person’s belief that behavior is capricious will make it  appear to
them that their view of the wayward other as susceptible to outside influences has been
vindicated regardless of whether their interventionist attempts succeed in getting  the other to
apologize, express remorse, mend their ways.  The conflictual relationship scenario I sketched
above was intended to capture what I believe to be a fundamental tenet of any philosophical or 
psychological approach that is founded on the belief in the irreducibility of blame. Since I claim
that the embodied intersubjective perspectives  mentioned in this paper fit that description, it
seems to me that the idea of an ‘adaptive’ anger or related blameful response to invalidation  is 
absolutely vital to such perspectives. Any theory asserting that motive can be hostage to,
conditioned by, arbitrary deviations in interest and caring, especially the valuing of another
person, would be unable to endorse the idea that all forms of anger, irritation, condemnation or
contempt are forms of hostility representing extortion of evidence in favor of a failed outlook.  
For instance, Gendlin, a phenomenological psychologist allied with Merleau-Ponty, considers
anger to be potentially adaptive. He says that one must attempt to reassess, reinterpret, elaborate
the angering experience via felt awareness not in order to eliminate the feeling of anger but so
that one’s anger becomes “fresh, expansive, active, constructive, and varies with changes in the 
situation”. “Anger may help handle the situation because it may make the other change or back 
away. Anger can also help the situation because it may break it entirely and thus give you new
circumstances.” “ Anger is healthy, while resentment and hate are detrimental to the organism.”  
The social constructionist Ken Gergen writes that anger has a valid role to play in social co- 
ordination “There are certain times and places in which anger is the most effective move in the 
dance.” 
Merleau-Ponty scholar John Russon(2020) offers:
“Anger can be unjustified, to be sure, and in that case it enacts a fundamentally distorted
portrayal of the other.  But anger can also be justified, and in that case it can be the only frame of
mind in which the vicious and hateful reality of the other is truly recognized.” (The Place of
Love).
Robert Solomon (1977), champion of the view that emotions are central to meaning and
significance in  human life, says that anger can be ‘right’.  
“ Anger, for example, is not just a burst of venom, and it is not as such sinful, nor is it necessarily 
a “negative” emotion. It can be “righteous,” and it can sometimes be right.”
McCoy (1977) upheld Kelly’s definition of hostility and anger as products of invalidated
construing but found it necessary to exclude contempt from this description. She defined
contempt as “awareness that the core role of another is comprehensively different from one’s
own and or does not meet the norms of social expectation”  (P 97.). 
Contempt, on her reading, represents validated construing, because “contempt predicts  
that it’s object will experience guilt “(P 98). Thus, the threatened structure is relieved of the
threat  caused by the others social deviation by a reaffirmation of the present system. McCoy 
(1977) upheld Kelly’s definition of hostility and anger as products of invalidated construing but
found it necessary to exclude contempt from this description. She defined contempt as
“awareness that the core role of another is comprehensively different from one’s own and or does
not meet the norms of social expectation”  (P 97.). 
Let’s now see how the above accounts compare with my radically temporal reading of Kellian
hostility. If , for any psychology, the arbitrariness of blame is irreducible in direct proportion to
the belief that the in-itself valuative content of our experiencing contributes to a shaping of our
motives and behavior in a way that we are not explicitly or implicitly aware of  (Fuchs’
horizontal unconscious), then this would seem to be incompatible with the spirit of Kelly’s
Choice corollary, which states that a  a person chooses for themself that alternative in a
dichotomized construct through which they anticipate the greater possibility for extension and
definition of their system. 
The Choice Corollary exemplifies the central importance of process, and the near irrelevance of
valuative content, in the organization of the construct system. The direction of motivation is
driven by the anticipatory integrity of the relationships between near-meaningless-in-themselves
contents, not by the supposed value-substance of the contents themselves. Kelly says “As in all
cases of hostility, the frustrated therapist starts to see the hazard as inherent in the elements
which he has been unable to construe successfully rather than in his construction of them.”
As I have written, to say that pleasure is what motivates us in our choices is as much as to say
that improvement in anticipatory efficacy, what Kelly calls elaboration, motivates our behavior.
In his process approach, all behavior is oriented toward making our world more intimately
understandable.  It is true that personal construct theory does not view pain and pleasure through
a reinforcement lens, but this is  because stimulus-response theory considers hedonic feeling to
be the content of a physiological event. For Kelly, pleasure, pain and all other variants of
affective valuation, are not properties of internal, external, nor socially shared value contents, but
are a function of how intimately, and how multi-dimensionally, we relate events to each other.
Validational evidence is just another way of describing the affectively felt assimilative coherence
of the construed flow of events and therefore it is synonymous with feeling valence. If one avoids
collapsing into emotional confusion as a result of an invalidating event, it is not because
validation and feeling can be separated, but because the invalidation impacted a relatively
subordinate portion of the construct system.
Kelly wrote: “It is not merely the invalidation of a construct that produces anxiety. 
Anxiety appears only if the construct is abandoned—appears no longer relevant— and there is
nothing to take its place.”
Believing that motivation is a function of semi-arbitrary shapings arising out of our sedimented
participation in social interactions intertwined with bodily dynamics, the  approaches I have been
critiquing do not see hedonic valuation as necessarily  synonymous with the pragmatic efficacy
of construing. For instance , Butt(1998) splits off hedonic valence from the organizational
integrity of experiencing. He believes that personal motivation is at the mercy of influences
outside our control. Thus, we can be motivated to make choices that are self-defeating, not 
within our control, not in our best interest. 
“... there is surely a danger that the constructivist assumes a good reason for every action,  
that every action represents an elaborative choice.““Kelly does not seem to entertain the 
possibility that the person ever makes non-elaborative choices.” 
In situations of personal distress, “the client might not be able to make any sense of the concept 
[of elaborative choice]. His or her experience is usually of being out of control, at the mercy of  
mysterious impulse. “ 
Such impulses do not originate from an internal construct system or other persons in a 
unidirectional manner , but are the product of joint action emerging from the social flow. 
“Being respectful of their choices does not mean implying that they have a cognitive system 
operating silently in their best interests beneath their awareness. It means helping them realize 
how they are sedimented in their interactions with the world, particularly the social world. If they 
opt for change, the system that will need to accommodate to it is social rather than cognitive.” 
Butt’s grounding of motive in socially shared value content threatens to turn Kelly’s elaborative
choice into a bouncing between the repressiveness of entrenched sedimented habit and the chaos
of a leap in the dark. Butt fails to see that the construct system does not achieve its integrative
continuity through any positive internal power. On the contrary, it simply lacks the formidability
of value content implied by socially embedded sedimentation necessary to impose the
arbitrariness of polarizing conditioning on the movement of experiential process. What drives
choice in Kelly’s Choice corollary isn’t a rationalist ‘gyroscope’ but the opposite, the
replacement of polarizing  value content with constructive process. From Kelly’s perspective it is
Butt’s sedimented, habitual social gestalt that fits the description of a dominating gyroscope.
Beneath the apparent chaos and  whim of blame (being ‘at the mercy of  mysterious impulse’) 
lies a radically temporal order in psychological movement that proves why neither  my own nor
another’s processes are capable of the content-driven arbitrariness that could lead to the
‘thoughtlessness’ of  anger-producing culpability.  
Why can one’s own processes never be ‘thoughtless’ enough to produce culpability in oneself  
and justify anger on the part of another? Because Kelly’s elaborative choice reflects the fact that
definition or  extension of one’s system defines or extends dimensional senses with not enough
substance,  force, power within themselves to arbitrarily polarize, disrupt, condition and repress.
Polarization,  force, capriciousness, repression are required as irreducible in experiencing in
order for the blamefulness  hostility and anger to be primordially justified.  What makes Kelly’s
definition of hostile so remarkable, then, is that it implies  that ALL situations that I  interpret as
apparent capriciousness NECESSARILY represent an invalid construal of the situation on my
part, and that, even if I am unable to arrive at a crisp construction that instantly  dispels the
justification for my hostility, there is such an explanation OF NECESSITY.  Blame is an
impermeable construct, one that must be abandoned once it is understood that intention could
never be arbitrary or capricious. 
“Some day we may know who to blame for a child's troubles, or we may give up the construct of 
"blame" altogether.”(Kelly 1963)
 As in the scenario I described of the hopeful interventionist impulse of ’adaptive’ anger, I
interpret the extortionist impulse of hostility as  rooted in the hopeful desire to influence the other
back where I think they should have been, even when there is no  communication with another,
either verbal, gestural or physical. The attempt at extorting evidence begins with the hopeful
thought that my attempt at influencing the other may be effective.  Even the most subtle variants
of anger are inconceivable without my sense that the person who disappointed me can be coaxed
by me,  whether gently or not so gently, back to where we believe they should have been . 
For this reason, I believe that Kelly intended his definition of hostility to apply to all feelings and 
expressions of blame aimed at another (or oneself in self-anger). These include: irritation, 
annoyance, disapproval, condemnation, feeling insulted, taking umbrage, resentment, 
exasperation, impatience, hatred, ire, outrage, contempt, righteous indignation, ‘adaptive’ anger, 
perceiving the other as deliberately thoughtless, lazy, culpable, perverse, inconsiderate,
disrespectful, disgraceful, greedy, evil, sinful, criminal. Any of the above feelings represent a
failure to understand what is in principle understandable without blame via a reorganization of 
one’s construct system. 
At the heart of blameful feeling is an unanswered question. What is the rationale behind the
perpetrator’s unfathomable behavior? Unable to come up with any workable justifiable
explanation of the other’s seemingly perverse shift in motive, the offended person attempts to
coerce the other into feeling self-blame, to ‘knock some sense back into them’. But since we
don't know why they violated our expectation of them, why and how they failed to do what our
blameful anger tells us they `should have' according to our prior estimation of their relation to us,
this guilt-inducing process is tentative, unsure.  
Even if we succeed in getting the blameful other to atone and re-establish their previous intimacy 
with us, we understand them no better than we did prior to their hostility-generating action, and 
thus our hostility provides an inadequate solution to our puzzlement and anxiety. All we have 
learned from the episode is that they other is potentially untrustworthy, unpredictable.  The
ineffectiveness of this approach can be seen in the fact that even if contempt succeeds in 
getting the perpetrator to mend their ways, an adequate understanding of his or her puzzling
motives has not been achieved. The very success of the contempt delays the pursuit of a 
permeable construction within which the other’s apparently arbitrary disappointing deviation
from what one expected of them can be seen as a necessary, adaptive elaboration of their way of
construing their role in the relationship.  
When confronted with behavior of another that is comprehensively different from our own, a 
mystery to us, and especially when it disturbs us, we are challenged by Kelly to bridge the gap 
between ourselves and the other not by attributing the problem to the other’s being at the mercy
of capriciously wayward motives which we may hope to re-shape, but by striving to subsume the 
other’s outlook within a revised version of our own system. What is left of the construct of
hostility if blaming another can be adaptive rather than always an extortion of evidence? It
becomes a toothless irrationality, a not being willing to accept that another has hurt me, let me
down, disrespected me, fallen out of love with me. Hostility would be strictly an attempt to prove
to oneself that the immediate insult never took place.
But even when one is convinced that the insult did indeed take place and can never be undone or 
denied, even when one pleads with, cajoles and threatens the other to reconsider their actions and 
apologize, even when one succeeds in eliciting the other’s remorse, even when one forgives the 
other’s transgression and prepares themself to start afresh in the relationship, all these changes 
in construing amount to no more than a retrenchment of the original inadequate outlook .
Contrary to McCoy’s (1977) contention that contempt, which she defines as  the expectation that
the other will experience guilt, represents validated construing, such an expectation, as a hopeful
wish,  would express the very essence of hostility. The intensity of our feeling of contempt is in
direct proportion to the unwillingness of the other to display guilt. Thus, the essential quality of
contempt is the need to make the other feel guilty. 
That Kelly(1955)  was not a fan of the cycle of blame, apology and forgiveness is suggested in
the following: 
“ Punishment may occasionally be used to make a person feel guilty and anxious in the honest  
hope that he will mend his ways. Sometimes we say that we ‘punish the crime and not the  
criminal’. This is silly; the ‘criminal’ gets punished nonetheless. We hope, however, that he will  
see that it is only a part of him that is condemned. The epigrammatic slogan may be a semantic  
device for leaving the door open for him to reestablish his role in our society rather than going
out and establishing a core role which is outside our society.” 
For Kelly, transcending anger by revising one’s construction of the event means arriving at an  
explanation that does not require the other’s contrition, which only serves to appease the hostile 
person rather than enlighten him. For the same reason, Kelly eschewed forgiveness and turning 
the other cheek. Such gestures only make sense in the context of blame, which implies a belief in 
the potential arbitrariness and capriciousness of human motives. Seeking the other’s atonement is 
not considered by Kelly to reflect an effective understanding of the original insult. Recounting a 
parable of Jesus and a woman“ He didn't even forgive her; that sort of unction didn't seem to be 
called for.” (Kelly 1961)
From Kelly’s vantage, if, rather than getting  angry or condemning another who wrongs me, I
respond with loving forgiveness, my absolution of the other presupposes my hostility toward
them. I can only forgive the other’s trespass to the extent that I recognize a sign of contrition or
confession on their part. Ideals of so-called unconditional forgiveness, of turning the other cheek,
loving one's oppressor, could also be understood as  conditional in various ways. In the absence
of the other's willingness to atone, I may forgive evil when I believe that there are special or
extenuating circumstances which will allow me to view the perpetrator as less culpable (the
sinner knows not what he does). I can say the other was blinded or deluded, led astray. My offer 
of grace is then subtly hostile, both an embrace and a slap. I hold forth the carrot of my love as a
lure, hoping thereby to uncloud the other's conscience so as to enable them to discover their
culpability. In opening my arms, I hope the prodigal son will return chastised, suddenly aware of
a need to be forgiven. Even when there is held little chance that the sinner will openly
acknowledge his sin, I may hope that my  outrage connects with a seed of regret and contrition
buried deep within the other, as if my `unconditional' forgiveness is an acknowledgment of God's
or the subliminal conscience of the other's apologizing in the name of the sinner. 
Kelly’s  formulation of hostility as an extortionistic irrealism may have left the door open for
personal construct theory writers to interpret it narrowly as an outright denial of a reality staring a
person in the face. 
Indeed, his use of those terms implies that the hostile person is aware at some level that their
attempts at attaining evidence to confirm their original hypothesis  is misguided, that they are
pretending to themselves that their original assessment of the situation is still valid when a part
of themselves already knows better. This seems to have encouraged a tendency among some
personal construct theory writers (see, for example, Kev Harding(2015)) to turn hostility into
what sounds to me more like a psychoanalytic-style defense mechanism than an elaborative
choice.  By this I mean  I don’t think hostility’s extortionist impulse should be read as
self-deceptive denial that one was significantly surprised and disappointed by another’s actions,
so much as a settling for an inadequate explanation for the reasons behind the other’s
unpredictability. That is to say, when in anger I seek to extort evidence, what I am attempting to
validate is my  impermeable construal of the other’s intent as ambiguous, obstinate and perverse.
My anger is motivated by, and looks for further confirmation of,  my pre-existing belief that the
people I care about  are susceptible to behaving  in recalcitrant, dangerous ways. 
“The hostile person insists that it is the elements which must be recalcitrant rather than his own 
thinking. Since many of his elements are people, he sees them as recalcitrant....he feels that the 
hazard lies in the people with whom he allowed himself to get mixed up. He thinks it is the
people who are dangerous, not his construction of them. Thus he sees his difficulty as arising out
of his ill-considered experimentation with inherently dangerous elements.” (Kelly 1955)
In one sense, this is a valid assessment, given the starting premise of  the unfathomability of
human motives. But because that starting premise is an ineffective guide for subsuming others’
behavior,  it leaves the person who relies on it vulnerable to all manner of future traumatic
surprises. In this sense it is a failure as an anticipatory device,  and the extorting of the other’s
contrition and apology only reaffirms this  failure. For instance, Trevor Butt’s belief that the
experience of a person in distress “is usually of being out of control, at the mercy of mysterious
impulse“ implies that an intervention that he might recommend in response to a client’s
seemingly unpredictable ‘self-defeating’ behavior would be based on blaming ‘mysterious
impulses’ for the client’s actions. Although such a response would fit Kelly’s definition of
hostility, it seems a bit excessive to treat Butt’s construal as self-deceptive. Rather, the blameful
intervention would be driven by a valid but somewhat impermeable construal of the client’s
outlook.
Just as the person who understands personal construct theory can no longer believe in the
blamefulness of anger, he can also no longer believe in the self-blame of guilt. This doesn’t mean
he doesn’t experience the pain of knowing his loss of role was responsible for another’s potential
or actual suffering, or his own. Kelly defines guilt as the perception of one’s apparent
dislodgment from one’s core role structure. Whatever one does in the light of his understanding
of others' outlooks may be regarded as his role. In guilt, our falling away from another we care
for could be spoken of as an alienation of  oneself from oneself. When we feel we have failed
another, we mourn our mysterious dislocation  from a competence or value which we associated
ourselves with. It follows from this that any  thinking of guilt as a `should have, could have’
blamefulness deals in a notion of dislocation and  distance, of a mysterious discrepancy within
intended meaning, separating who we were from who we are in its teasing gnawing abyss. But to
have assimilated the lessons of personal construct theory is to perceive one’s  guilt as a
paired-down suffering because it is a responsibility without self-blame.
What’s the difference between a blameful and a non-blameful awareness that one’s construction
of one’s role with respect to another has lost a former intimacy and coherence? It is the flip side
of blameful hostility at the other’s changed construction of their role in relation to me.  In both
cases, the philosophies of blame attribute an aspect of value to the intrinsic content of an element
of meaning, so one can be conditioned by an outside influence to arbitrarily lose or lessen one’s
ability to care about another. My anger then tries to recondition that feeling of caring back into
the other person (knock some sense back into them).  But for Kelly, value and caring is never an
attribute or property of a content of meaning, but is  instead a function of the assimilative
intricacy and permeability of the movement from one  moment of experience to the next. The
good therapist “does not become annoyed with his data! “ “...he seeks to bring about changes
which are based on understanding rather than on blame.” 
The Choice corollary guarantees that the behavior that one later feels guilty about was the best
one could do at the time to elaborate one’s system.  Kelly’s elaborative choice determines the
direction of this temporal flow as always either toward increased understanding, or at least
preservation of one’s current level of understanding.  When Kelly talked about sin and guilt in
terms of mistakes, he invariably added a caveat that  what appears as a mistake from some
external perspective can just as well be seen as a deviation  from the conventional or the basis of
a new outlook. Speaking of his feelings of guilt after his heart attack:
“ Besides, I still could not put my finger on where all my mistakes had been - mostly I knew only 
where I had deviated from convention - or whether all of them had actually been mistakes; nor
did I know what could readily be done even if they had been mistakes. Naturally, I had some
clues, here and there, but, in the main these were questions it would take years to work out, and,
if I did well with them, they would be followed by further, more perspicacious questions.” (Kelly
1960)
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